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Abstract
The seminal contribution of Debreu-Scarf [4] connects the two concepts of core
and competitive equilibrium in exchange economies. In eﬀect, their core-equilibrium
equivalence result states that, when the set of economic agents is replicated, the set
of core allocations of the replica economy shrinks to the set of competitive alloca-
tions. Florenzano [6] deﬁnes the fuzzy core as the set of allocations which cannot
be blocked by any coalition with an arbitrary rate of participation and then shows
the asymptotic limit of cores of replica economies coincides with the fuzzy core. In
this note, we provide an elementary proof of the non-emptiness of the fuzzy core
for an exchange economy. Unlike the classical Debreu-Scarf limit theorem [4] and
its numerous extensions our result does not require any asymptotic intersection -or
limit- of the set of core allocations of replica economies.
JEL classiﬁcation codes: D51, C71.
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11 Introduction
The core is a meaningful solution concept for market economies. If an allocation of re-
sources has the property that a group of people is able to achieve a preferred outcome for
its members, using only the resources of the group membership, then it is reasonable to
assume that the group will attempt to block that allocation. In this sense, allocations not
in the core are unstable. While competitive price-taking equilibrium outcomes are in the
core, in general the core is larger than the set of equilibrium allocations. The question of
the relationship of the core of an economy to the set of competitive equilibrium alloca-
tions originates with Edgeworth’s [5] conjecture that, if an economy were replicated, the
core of an economy would shrink to the set of competitive equilibrium allocations. The
seminal contribution of Debreu-Scarf [4] gives a rigorous treatment of Edgeworth’s conjec-
ture [5]. The underlying idea is that, if the number of agents in the market is suﬃciently
large, no single agent can have monopoly power. Consequently, a competitive price-taking
equilibrium will be sustained.
Florenzano [6], following Aubin’s [2] notion of fuzzy coalitions, deﬁnes the notion of a
fuzzy core as the set of allocations that cannot be blocked by any coalition with an arbitrary
rate of participation. Under a weak continuity assumption on preference relations, the
asymptotic limit of core of replica economics coincides with the fuzzy core. Accordingly,
in the context of a private-ownership production economy with nontransitive preference
relations, Florenzano [6] establishes the nonemptiness of the fuzzy core. By enlarging the
feasible payoﬀ sets for coalitions, Predtetchinski [8] provides an alternative proof of the
non-emptiness of the fuzzy core. Notwithstanding the novelty of this approach, the result
still relies on a conventional limit argument.
In this note our main contribution is to provide an elementary proof of non-emptiness of
the fuzzy core. In particular, unlike the Debreu- Scarf result and its numerous extensions
(see Aliprantis etal [1], Florenzano [6], and Predtetchinski [8] amongst others) our result
does not require any asymptotic intersection. Instead of allowing the economy to become
large through replication, we enlarge the set of feasible payoﬀs for the economy in utility
space. We deﬁne feasible payoﬀs as those achievable by coalitions with arbitrary compo-
sitions of their memberships, where the rate of participation of an individual player in a
coalition is expressed as a proportion. This setting is closely related to the one introduced
by Predtetchinski [8], with two exceptions. First, our setting does not require a lower
bound on each rate of participation in fuzzy coalitions. Second, rather than using recent
results on the payoﬀ–dependent balancedness and the core due to Bonnisseau-Iehl´ e [3] and
Predtetchinski-Herings [7], our result is established directly by using the Fan coincidence
theorem. In the sense that our proof uses elementary arguments, it makes the same sort
of contribution for the fuzzy core as that of Vohra [10] and Shapley and Vohra [9] for the
core. A novel feature of our proof is that in our ﬁxed point argument it is essential to trace
some payoﬀs back to their corresponding participation rates.
The note is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the notation. Section 3 is
devoted to the basic model and deﬁnitions and Section 4 is dedicated to the proof of the
result. We will show that the fuzzy core of an exchange economy is non-empty.
22 Notation
Let n be a positive integer and N be the set of integers {1,...,n}. The symbol RN denotes
the space of functions x : i ∈ N  → xi ∈ R. Let ∆ denote the unit simplex in RN, thus
∆ = {π ∈ RN |πi ≥ 0 for all i ∈ N and
 
i∈N πi = 1}. For each point π in ∆ let supp(π)
denote the set {i ∈ N | πi > 0}. Let β denote the barycenter of ∆. For a subset A of RN,
the symbols intA and ∂A denote, respectively, the interior and the boundary of A.
3 Fuzzy core
We consider a pure exchange economy E in which the set of agents is N, and the commodity
space is Rl. Each agent i ∈ N is characterized by a consumption set Xi ⊆ Rl, initial
endowment of commodities ei ∈ Rl, and a utility function ui : Xi → R. We employ the
following assumptions:
(A1) For each i ∈ N, the set Xi is a non–empty closed convex and bounded below subset
of Rl containing ei.
(A2) For each i ∈ N the utility function ui is a continuous and quasi–concave function.
Let us denote the product ×i∈NXi by X. Let F(E) denote the set
 
x ∈ X
    
i∈N xi ≤  
i∈N ei 
of commodity allocations that are feasible for the grand coalition N.
Deﬁnition 1 An allocation x ∈ F(E) is an element of the fuzzy core Cf(E) of the economy




i∈N πiei and ui(xi) <
ui(χi) for all i ∈ supp(π).
The main result of this paper is the following theorem.
Theorem 1 The fuzzy core of the economy E is non–empty.
In the next section we establish a characterization of the fuzzy core in the utility space
and prove Theorem 1. Our construction resembles that in Predtetchinski [8], but is diﬀerent
in two ways. First, we remove an exogenous lower bound on the participation rates in a
fuzzy coalition, thus obtaining a direct characterization of the fuzzy core that does not rely
on any limit argument. Second, our proof is independent of the non–emptiness result for
the core with additional requirements in Bonnisseau and Iehl´ e [3] and is based ultimately
on the Fan’s coincidence theorem.
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Proposition 1 The set V is a non–empty closed and proper subset of RN. Moreover, it
is comprehensive from below: if ¯ v ∈ V , v ∈ RN and vi ≤ ¯ vi for all i ∈ N, then v ∈ V .
Proof. The non–emptiness, the properness and comprehensiveness from below of the set
V are immediate from the deﬁnition. We establish the closedness of V .
For each player i, choose a vector ci in Rl such that ci ≤ xi for all xi ∈ Xi. Let vq be a
sequence of points in V converging to a point v of RN. We must show that v is an element




















q) for all i ∈ supp(πq). (2)
Replacing if necessary the sequences by subsequences, suppose that πq converges to a point
π of ∆. Now we argue that for each j ∈ supp(π) the sequence xj
q is bounded from above
































establishing the existence of an upper bound for the sequence xj
q. Once again, replacing
the sequences by subsequences, we can assume that the sequence xi
q converges to a point
xi of Xi for all i ∈ supp(π).


































i) for all i ∈ supp(π).
This implies that v is element of V , as desired.






     
   










Proposition 2 For each v ∈ V the set Π(v) is non–empty and convex. The correspondence
Π has a closed graph.
The proof of this proposition is similar to that of Proposition 3 in Predtetchinski [8].
The following proposition summarizes the relationship between the fuzzy core on the
one hand, and the set V and the correspondence Π, on the other hand. Its proof is
straightforward and is therefore omitted.
Proposition 3 Let x be an allocation in the fuzzy core of the economy E and let v ∈ RN
be given by ui(xi) = vi for all i ∈ N. Then v ∈ ∂V and β ∈ Π(v). Conversely, let v ∈ ∂V
be such that β ∈ Π(v). Then there is an allocation x in the fuzzy core of the economy E
such that vi ≤ ui(xi) for all i ∈ N.
Under the maintained assumptions F(E) is a compact set. Therefore, for each i ∈ N
there is a number ¯ mi such that ui(xi) < ¯ mi for all x ∈ F(E). For each i ∈ N also choose
a number mi such that mi < ui(ei). Deﬁne ¯ V denote the set
¯ V = V ∩ {i ∈ R
N | v
i ≤ ¯ m
i for all i ∈ N}.
A point v ∈ V belongs to the boundary of ¯ V if and only if either v ∈ ∂V or vi = ¯ mi for
some i ∈ N, see Figure 1.
Proposition 4 There is a homeomorphism h from the space ∆ to the space ∂ ¯ V ∩ {v ∈
RN | vi ≥ mi for all i ∈ N} such that hi(π) = mi whenever π ∈ ∆ and i ∈ N − supp(π).
Proof. Let π ∈ ∆ be given. Let R be the ray emanating from the point m = (m1,...mn)
in the direction of π. Thus, every point r of R is of the form r = m + tπ for some non-
negative real number t. First we argue that the ray R intersects the boundary of ¯ V at
exactly one point.
To see that R does intersect ∂ ¯ V , observe that the point m belongs to both to the set
¯ V and to the ray R. Thus, the set R1 = R ∩ ¯ V is non–empty. Furthermore, for any
i ∈ supp(π), there is an r ∈ R such that ri ≥ ¯ mi, so that r lies outside the interior of ¯ V .
Therefore, the set R2 = R∩(RN−int¯ V ) is non–empty. Thus R1 and R2 are the non–empty
closed subsets of R whose union is R. By connectedness of R, the set R1 ∩ R2 = R ∩ ∂ ¯ V
must be non–empty.
Suppose that the set R ∩ ∂ ¯ V contains two distinct points v and ¯ v. Thus v = m + tπ
and ¯ v = m + ¯ tπ for some non–negative reals t and ¯ t. Without a loss of generality we can
5assume that t < ¯ t. For each i ∈ N − supp(π), we then have vi = mi < ¯ mi. For each








is entirely contained in V . Therefore, if v is a point of RN with some coordinate vi equal
to mi, it is contained in the interior of V . It follows that if N − supp(π) is non–empty,
then the point v is contained in the interior of V . If supp(π) = N, then because vi < ¯ vi for
all i ∈ N and ¯ v ∈ V , we know that v lies in the interior of V . We have thus demonstrated
that the inequality vi < ¯ mi holds for all i ∈ N and that v is in the interior of V . It follows
that v is in the interior of ¯ V , a contradiction.
Deﬁne the map h by letting h(π) be the unique point in the intersection of the ray R
and the set ∂ ¯ V . We now demonstrate that h has an inverse. Let g denote a map from






The denominator in the right–hand side is always positive, because the point m lies in the
interior of ¯ V . It is easy to see that g is indeed the inverse of h, that is h ◦ g and g ◦ h are
equal to the respective identity maps.
Clearly, g is a continuous map. Furthermore, because its domain is compact and the
codomain is Hausdorﬀ, it carries closed sets to closed sets. Therefore, also h is a continuous
map. This proves that h is a homeomorphism.
The rest of the proof relies on a version of the Fan’s coincidence theorem, as stated below.
Given a non–empty and convex subset Y of RN and a point y of Y , let N(Y,y) = {z ∈
RN | (y − y′)⊤z ≥ 0 for all y′ ∈ Y } denote the normal cone of the set Y at the point y. A
zero point of a correspondence Φ : Y ⇉ RN is a point y of Y such that Φ(y) contains the
zero.
Theorem 2 Let Y be a non–empty compact and convex subset of RN. Let Φ : Y ⇉ RN be
a correspondence with non–empty convex values having a compact graph. Suppose that for
every y ∈ Y and for every z ∈ N(Y,y) there exists a φ ∈ Φ(y) such that z⊤φ ≤ 0. Then Φ
has a zero point.
Proposition 5 There exists v∗ ∈ ∂V such that β ∈ Π(v∗).
Proof. It is suﬃcient to prove that there is a point v∗ ∈ ∂ ¯ V such that β ∈ Π(v∗). For this
would mean that there is a point x ∈ F(E) such that vi ≤ ui(xi) for all i ∈ N, implying
that vi < ¯ mi for all i ∈ N. Therefore, v∗ ∈ ∂V , as desired.
Let h be a homeomorphism of Proposition 4. Deﬁne the correspondence Φ : ∆ ⇉ RN
by letting Φ(π) = Π(h(π)) − {β} for all π ∈ ∆. Clearly, the correspondence Φ has non–
empty and convex values. Its graph is closed, because h is continuous and the graph of Π
6is closed. Since Φ maps a compact set ∆ into a compact set ∆−{β}, its graph is, in fact,
a compact set.
We now verify the boundary condition of the Fan’s coincidence theorem. Let π ∈ ∆ be
given. Let v denote the vector h(π) and let S denote the (possibly empty) set N −supp(π).




n    z = a1 +
 
i∈S liri, a ∈ R, li ≤ 0
 
,
where 1 = (1,...,1) and (r1,...,rn) is the standard ordered basis of RN. Let z ∈ N(∆,π)
be given. If π belongs to the relative interior of ∆ so that supp(π) = N, then z is
proportional to the vector 1. In this case the inequality z⊤φ = 0 holds for every φ ∈ Φ(π).
Consider now the case where π lies on the relative boundary of ∆, so that the set S is
non–empty. Then vi = mi and therefore vi < ui(ei) for all i ∈ S. But this implies that the
set Π(v) contains the entire face ∆S = {¯ π ∈ ∆| ¯ πi = 0 for all i ∈ N\S} of the simplex ∆.
In particular, Π(v) contains the barycenter βS of ∆S. The vector φ = βS − β is therefore
an element of Φ(π). Since 0 ≤ φi for all i ∈ S, the inequality φ⊤z ≤ 0 holds.
By the Fan’s coincidence theorem, the correspondence Φ has a zero point, say π∗. Let-
ting v∗ be equal to h(π∗), we see that v∗ ∈ ∂ ¯ V and β ∈ Π(v∗).
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Figure 1: The boundary of the set set ¯ V .
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